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C. Joseph DOYLE vs. Hillary GOODRIDGE & others.
[FN1]
SJC-09254
May 27, 2005.
Practice, Civil, Moot case, Stay of proceedings,
Rescript from appellate court, Judicial discretion. Supreme
Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice.
Robert J. Muise, of Michigan, & Chester
Darling (Brian Fahling, of Mississippi,
with them) for the plaintiff.
Michele E. Granda (Gary D. Buseck with
her) for Hillary Goodridge & others.
John R. Hitt, Assistant Attorney General, for
Department of Public Health.
RESCRIPT.
In Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440
Mass. 309 (2003), we declared "that barring an
individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations
of civil marriage solely because that person would
marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts
Constitution." Id. at 344. We vacated a
summary judgment that had been entered in the Superior
Court for the defendants in that action, and remanded
the case to the Superior Court for the entry of a judgment
consistent with our opinion. Id. We further
provided that the "[e]ntry of judgment shall be
stayed for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take
such action as it may deem appropriate in light of
[the] opinion." Id. The petitioner, C.
Joseph Doyle, was not a party in the Goodridge action.
In April, 2004, before the court-ordered stay of the
entry of judgment had expired,
Doyle petitioned a single justice of this court to
extend further the stay "pending the outcome of
the process to amend the Commonwealth's Constitution." [FN2]
The single justice denied that request on several grounds.
First, he stated that he, as a single justice, did
not have the authority to change the specific directive
that the full court had given to the Superior Court
in its rescript, after the rescript had already issued
to the Superior Court. [FN3] He further stated that,
even if he had authority to grant the relief requested,
he would exercise his discretion to deny the relief
sought by Doyle because (1) as a matter of Massachusetts
law, an individual, such as Doyle, who is not a party
to a case is not permitted to attempt to alter, amend,
or stay an appellate court's rescript in the case,
and that Doyle's attempt to do so was, "at base,
an improper collateral attempt by a nonparty to alter
the full court's rescript and affect the outcome";
(2) Doyle's claim that his right to participate in
the constitutional amendment process would be diluted
without a further stay was speculative and remote,
and, therefore, he lacked standing as a matter of Massachusetts
law to pursue the requested relief; and (3) the request
for a stay for a minimum of two years while the constitutional
amendment process ran its course was unreasonable in
the circumstances.
Doyle timely appealed to the full court from the single
justice's denial of his petition.
In a "memorandum in support of appeal" that
he filed shortly after filing his notice of appeal,
he requested that the full court "further stay
the entry of its judgment ... pending the outcome of
the constitutional amendment process." In response
to that memorandum, we issued an order, among other
things, denying his request for a further stay. [FN4]
The limited issue before us in this appeal is whether
the single justice erred or abused his discretion when
he denied Doyle's request for a further stay of entry
of the judgment after rescript in the Superior Court.
That question is purely academic at this point. The
judgment, entry of which Doyle sought to have stayed,
was in fact entered in the Superior Court on May 17,
2004, pursuant to the terms of our rescript. We therefore
dismiss his appeal as moot. See Rasten v. Northeastern
Univ., 432 Mass. 1003 (2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1168 (2001). Even if we were to consider the point
on the merits, we would conclude that the single justice
was correct and well within his discretion in denying
Doyle's request for the reasons given.
To the extent that Doyle is now attempting to shift
focus and expand the limited scope of the appeal by
asking the full court to "stay" the judgment--
effectively, to recall and amend our rescript and vacate
the judgment that has already been entered--we decline
to do so. We previously denied his request for
a further stay of entry of the judgment before the
judgment entered in the Superior Court. Nothing has
transpired in the interim that materially changes the
situation or which warrants the truly extraordinary
measures sought now.
Appeal dismissed.
1. Julie Goodridge, David Wilson, Robert Compton, Michael
Horgan, Edward Balmelli, Maureen Brodoff, Ellen Wade,
Gary Chalmers, Richard Linnell, Heidi Norton, Gina
Smith, Gloria Bailey, Linda Davies, Department of Public
Health, and the Commissioner of Public Health.
2. The process to amend the Massachusetts Constitution
in response to our decision began in February, 2004,
with the Legislature's consideration, at a constitutional
convention, of various proposed amendments.
3. The rescript issued to the Superior Court on December
16, 2003, twenty-eight days after the date of the rescript.
See Mass. R.A.P. 23, as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
There was no petition for rehearing or request to stay
issuance of the rescript. Doyle did not file his request
for a further stay of the entry of the judgment until
April 20, 2004, four months after the rescript issued
to the trial court.
4. We also denied his request, made in his notice of
appeal, to expedite this appeal.
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